Management Compensation and the Performance of Mutual Funds by Michael K. Berkowitz & Yehuda Kotowitz
Department of Economics
and
Institute for Policy Analysis
150 St. George Street





Management Compensation and the Performance of Mutual Funds
Michael K. Berkowitz
Yehuda Kotowitz




email: berk@chass.utoronto.ca  The authors wish to thank the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for their
1
financial support. Thanks are also due to Gordon Anderson, Cheng Hsiao and Tom McCurdy for their helpful
suggestions and to Ata Mazaheri for providing able research assistance.  The authors alone are responsible for all
errors and opinions.  
Management Compensation and the Performance of Mutual Funds  
1
by
Michael K. Berkowitz 
University of Toronto, Department of Economics and Faculty of Management
 150 St. George St., Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G7
 (416) 978-2678; email: berk@chass.utoronto.ca
and 
Yehuda Kotowitz
University of Toronto, Department of Economics
 150 St. George St., Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G7
 (416) 978-4181; email: yehuda@chass.utoronto.ca
First Draft: April 1997
Comments Welcome
Management Compensation and the Performance of Mutual Funds 
by Michael K. Berkowitz and Yehuda KotowitzABSTRACT
 This paper examines the mutual fund market as a market for the sale of  management
services using an unbalanced panel of 860 US equity funds over the 1976-1993 period.  From
among the performance measures for which investors have the necessary information to compute, 
we find that the Jensen measure best explains the change in market shares over time.  It is found,
however, that investors actually value the systematic component of risk more than indicated by
the use of Jensen's performance measure.  Our results also suggest that investors in load funds are
less responsive to both components of performance (risk and return) than are investors in no-load
funds.  Investors, moreover,  value recent past performance differently for funds with different
attributes.  An important result of the paper relating to the incentives provided with the widely
used fixed-fee compensation schemes is that past fund performance influences individual
investment decisions and hence future net asset values of funds, implying strong incentives for




Management Compensation and the Performance of Mutual Funds
Driven by the boom in retirement savings, mutual funds now hold record assets of $3.1
trillion, exceeding bank deposits in the U.S. as well as the gross domestic products of Britain and
Canada. Of this sum, about $1.47 trillion represents investment in U.S. equities with 83% of the
stock  investment being made during the past five years.  As the baby boomer generation ages and
their disposable income continues to increase, the size of their investment in mutual funds is also
expected to grow.  Along with this explosion of capital being invested in the industry, almost
unnoticed has been the sizeable management fees which are being taken out on an annual basis. 
Conservatively, management fees at 1% of net asset value would extract more than $30 billion
each year from the value of the unitholders’ investment.  
Why hasn’t this sum attracted more attention in both the finance literature and among
investors?  From the standpoint of investors, one reason they appear unconcerned with the size of
this massive transfer payment may be that the S&P 500 composite index rose an average of
15.3% per year on a pre-tax basis over the last 10 years so that management fees have been
dwarfed by comparison to the capital gains and dividends which investors realized. In the
academic literature, the void of papers examining the structure of management fees has been filled
with papers focussing on performance measurement, the persistence of that performance over
2  Goetzmann & Ibbotson (1991); Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotsman & Ross (1992); Hendricks, Patel &
3
Zeckhauser (1993); Shukla & Trzcinska (1994); Elton, Gruber & Blake (1995); and Christopherson, Ferson &
Glassman (1995), Carhart (1997) among others.   
  Ippolito (1989); Elton, Gruber, Das & Hlavka (1993); and Malkiel (1995), among others. 
4
  Section 205 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 permits performance fee contracts and requires that
5
compensation paid under a performance fee contract must increase and decrease proportionately with the
investment fund under management in relation to the investment record of an appropriate index of security prices
or other measure of investment performance as the Commission may specify. According to Carole Gould ( New
York Times, October 24, 1993), Lipper Analytical Services listed only 59 of 3682 existing mutual funds at the
time that charged management fees based upon contingent performance.   As of February 1994, Morningstar
identified for us 68 funds that used performance-based remuneration schemes. This is in sharp contrast from the
boom times of the late 1960's and early 1970's when performance-based fees were much more popular.  Gould
suggests that the evolution toward flat fees was given impetus by legislation in 1970 that mandated "fulcrum" fees.
Prior to this ruling, fund managers could be rewarded for superior performance without an offsetting decline in
income when performance lagged.
2
time  and tests of whether or not fund managers cover their fees .  
3 4
Little work has been directed toward looking at the incentive effects associated with this
immense transfer of wealth annually from unitholders to managers even though alternative
performance-based remuneration schemes are possible.  The exceptions include the work by
5
Berkowitz & Kotowitz (1993) who show that the strong link between historical performance and
fund market share provides Canadian equity fund managers with substantial monetary incentives
which may explain why more fund managers have not chosen performance-based remuneration
schemes over the widely accepted asset-based remuneration mechanisms. In a related paper that
focuses on the agency conflict between investors and fund managers, Chevalier and Ellison (1995)
find mutual fund managers alter their investment portfolios by taking on greater risk over the
latter third of the year  in a manner consistent with their incentives.  Using a tournament
framework that compares funds on the basis of their relative performance,  Brown, Harlow &
Starks (1996) find a result similar to Chevalier and Ellison, i.e., fund managers likely to end up
losers manipulate fund risk differently from those fund managers likely to end up winners.     For most consumer goods, buyers are generally less informed than sellers.  What distinguishes services
6
from other consumer goods is that the purchaser of a service is unable to examine the good prior to its purchase. 
Although examination of a good prior to its purchase does not eliminate the moral hazard and adverse selection
problems, not being able to observe the good attenuates these problems.  
3
In his presidential address to the American Finance Association, Martin Gruber (1996)
raised a question about the way in which open ended mutual funds are priced.  Unlike Gruber, our
approach to the question of mutual fund pricing is to view the mutual fund market as a market for
the sale of portfolio management services.  In this respect, the market is similar to the sale of
other professional services, such as medical or legal services.  A common feature among these
services is that buyers are generally less informed than sellers, leading to potentially serious moral
6
hazard and adverse selection problems.   In the case of medical and legal services, these problems
are partially resolved by regulations setting qualifications for entry, minimum standards of service
and adjudication processes.
These regulations are largely absent in the case of mutual funds, where controls are
typically directed toward preventing the misappropriation of entrusted money and to rules of
disclosure.  An alternative solution is to design a contract that perfectly aligns the interests of
managers and unitholders. The problem with doing so is the lack of agreement between parties
regarding the acceptable criteria  for evaluation.  Moreover, while some signalling is associated
with the form of the existing contract, most management contracts are fairly standard.  Managers
receive a fee for their services which includes expenses incurred ( e.g. research, trading,
administrative, etc.) as well as selling expenses (e.g. advertising, sales commissions (load and 12b-
1), etc.).  Hence, there is little flexibility for signalling quality.
The market for management services is mainly disciplined by competition among the many4
sellers of such services.  The question which arises is whether, in the face of relative consumer
ignorance, which generates considerable perceived product differentiation, such competition is
sufficient to insure efficiency.   That is, will competition among sellers align the incentives of
managers and unitholders so as to insure both the appropriate effort and risk-taking on the part of
managers?  Moreover, does this competition result in competitive prices (fees) for management
services?
The source of the differentiation between funds can be found in both the objective and 
subjective characteristics of funds.  The objective characteristics include differences in managerial
style, risk, ability of managers and differences in consumer tastes for risk, etc.  On the other hand,
the subjective characteristics are associated with a general lack of knowledge by consumers.  That
is, consumers are unable to distinguish between managerial characteristics due to a large element
of firm specific randomness.
As in other differentiated services, the main source of market discipline arises through
reputation.  Consumers make their investment choice according to the reputation of the managers. 
This is reflected in past performance as well as by word of mouth, advertising and broker
recommendations, which in turn are also partly reflected in past performance.
The question is, in the presence of these market imperfections, is competition strong
enough to generate the appropriate incentives for managers to supply the desired quality at
competitive prices?  To answer this question, we need to estimate the demand for individual
funds.  Using these results we can then investigate the incentives to perform in the unitholder's
interests.   
Our study differs from other work in the following ways.  First, we model demand for A discussion of performance measurement is deferred to Section 2.0 .
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individual funds on the basis of an explicit consumer choice model which has been found to be
very useful in modelling the demand for differentiated products using public information available
at the decision time.    Second, we explicitly test and evaluate alternative measures of performance
from among those available to consumers, to see how consumers evaluate risk.  Third, we
examine the rationality of consumer choices.  Finally, we employ an extensive data base that
allows the analysis to take advantage of panel procedures.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 describes the underlying consumer choice
model while Section 2 evaluates alternative performance criteria.  Section 3 describes the data
used in the study.  Section 4 presents the empirical results.  Section 5 examines whether investors
are acting rationally when they base their decision on past performance.  Section 6 examines the
specific incentive properties of asset-based mechanisms. Finally,  Section 7 is by way of summary.
  
  1.0   The Consumer Choice Model
A random effects consumer choice model à la McFadden (1974) is used to estimate the
demand for individual mutual funds.  This consumer choice approach has been widely used in the
past to develop models used to estimate the demand for a variety of consumer related services
such as transportation and energy as well as for brand choice modelling. 
We assume that investors choose between alternative mutual funds on the basis of their
expected performance.  We further assume that investors’ expectations of future performance are
7







lEVjt l jt j





etc. that are in the public domain.  Investors are also assumed to form their expectations of future
performance on the basis of private information received by each investor and which is not
available to other investors.  For simplicity we assume that these private messages are random and
uncorrelated with the publicly available information. 
Formally, let U be investor i's expectation of the performance of fund j in period t where ijt  
with EV being the component of expected performance which is the same for all investors. The jt 
investor-specific variables are represented by µ  and  .  µ  represents the unobserved ikt ijt ikt
component of expected performance associated with investor i's information about the k-th 
available investment class (e.g., bonds, stocks, mutual funds, etc.) and   is  the unobserved ijt
component of expected performance associated with investor i's information about the j-th mutual
fund. We assume that  is iid extreme value distributed each period as is (µ +  ). We further ijt  ikt ijt
assume that expectations of future performance are based upon past performance.  
In order to impose minimum restrictions on the nature of expectations, it is assumed that



















  Refer to McFadden (1974 ) for the derivation of market shares when the errors are distributed according
9
to an extreme value distribution.
 Although our sample is representative of the Morningstar equity fund sample, it should be recognized
10
that N  should be the total population of equity funds available to investors.  This introduces an additional error in kt





where x   represents the performance of fund j in t-l;  is the information about fund j in period t jt-l jt 
which is the same for all investors (e.g. advertising) and   refers to the information about fund j j 
which is constant across investors as well as time (e.g. load).  Investors choose simultaneously
whether to invest in equity mutual funds and if so, which fund(s) to invest in to maximize
expected performance.
It follows that the market share of fund j in period t, given that the investor chooses to
invest in mutual funds, is:
9
where N  is the number of alternatives (funds) available in investment class k in period t.  kt
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Taking 
the logarithm of (3),




































Substituting (5) into (2) and then the revised  (2) into (4), we obtain the following fixed effects 
equation: 
.
Equation (6) is the basic market share estimation equation  with time dummies substituted 
for the unobservable Q.   Because we would like to test for the presence of non-linearities in the  t
performance variable as well as for the possibility that the b coefficients may vary across funds l
and 
not be constant as expressed in (6), we use the following equation for our empirical estimation of 
the model:
We examine the hypothesis that the b coefficients are functions of specific fund attributes by l
 crossing the b  with m alternative fund characteristics (A ).  This introduces a non-linearity in the l kj
coefficients so that OLS can no longer be used.  Instead, we adopt a non-linear estimation
technique to jointly estimate the coefficients of the lagged performance variables (b 's) and the l
coefficient of each attribute,  .   Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that investors respond k
to past performance in a non-linear fashion, giving higher weights to extreme performances,
possibly because of increased publicity.  Funds are more likely to heavily advertize superior
performance and avoid advertizing poor performance.  The financial press, moreover, tends to
highlight extreme performances at either end of the spectrum.  Consequently, the nature of the  As well, survivorship bias affects funds with poor results, but not those funds with good results,
11
eliminating poor funds from the sample and possibly weakening the non-linearity at the bottom of the performance
scale.  
  See, for example, Fama (1972) and Moses, Cheyney and Veit (1987). Reilly (1989), moreover, has
12
shown that the rank correlation coefficients among alternative measures are all above .900 when measured over a
specific common, constant time period.  We find that the correlation among alternative performance measures, on
a moving basis over time varies with the performance measure.  Over the sample period 1976-93, Table 3 shows
that the Sharpe and Treynor measures have a correlation of .99 or higher, depending upon the objective of the
fund.   However, the Jensen measure has a much lower correlation with the Sharpe measure, depending upon the
fund objective, ranging from .38 for Growth & Income funds to .61 for Small Company Growth funds.    
    Investors who are assessing their investment portfolios make decisions to buy or hold alternative
13
funds in their choice sets based upon their expectations of the future performance of the available funds.  These
expectations are revised over time with the addition of new information so that a moving average performance
measure must be used to represent this process.  This is in contrast to usual performance evaluation which is based
upon ex post measurement over a constant period of time. 
9
non-linearity is likely to vary for positive and negative performance.    
11
2.0 The Evaluation of Performance
Performance evaluation for the sophisticated investor suffers a number of problems.  The
correct relationship between risk and return remains unresolved as do questions regarding the
correct measure of risk to use and how to account for shifting parameters of the performance
measure when portfolios are actively managed.  While various studies have analyzed the
components of investment performance , most investors in mutual funds lack the required
12
information to determine the components of these measures and therefore do not use this
information to determine their allocation of resources to alternative funds.   
13
The information typically provided by the media are holding period returns over 3-month
through 10-year periods, most recent risk measures (e.g. standard deviation of returns and beta)
and comparative benchmarks such as the return on the S&P 500.  One of  objectives of this paper
is to identify the available information actually used by individuals investing in mutual funds. 10
Initially, the optimal lag structure must be determined for the model specified in (6). Consistent
with the view of limited available information considered by the typical investor in mutual funds,
we have chosen for this purpose to measure fund performance using the Jensen (1968)
performance measure (alpha), i.e., R - R  -  (R -R ) where R  is the return on fund i  in quarter it ft it Mt ft it
t, R  is the risk-free rate of return in t measured by the 90-day T-Bill rate, R  is the market rate ft  Mt
of return as measured by the return on the S&P 500 over the quarter and   is the systematic risk it
of fund i in quarter t.  If our hypotheses about investor behavior is correct, the results of this study
should provide some insight into the way mutual fund investors evaluate risk, regardless of the
theoretical justification for such evaluation.  
3.0  Description of Data 
The sample of mutual funds used in this study was derived from two sources.  The
Morningstar (June 1994) OnDisk provided monthly return data on 3439 U.S. funds over the
period January 1976 - December 1993. Quarterly net asset values funds were obtained from
Lipper Analytical Securities for 1551 equity funds over the period January 1981 - December
1993. The focus of the study was limited to U.S. equity funds so that we constructed a merged
data base consisting of aggressive growth, growth, growth and income, small company growth
and equity-income funds common to both the Morningstar and Lipper data bases.  This resulted in
an unbalanced panel consisting of 860 funds. Table 1 describes the representativeness of the
sample. When compared to the overall sample of 1174 U.S. equity firms in the Morningstar
database, our sub-sample is very similar with respect to size distribution, load, tenure of manager





  Refer to Judge, et al (1985).  The Schwarz Criteria, SC(k), is defined as:
14
where T is the number of observations, k is the number of lags and   is the variance of the residuals.  Strictly k
2
speaking, the Schwarz criteria does not apply to the case of panel data.  However, because our model employs time
dummies, model specification testing using the Schwarz criteria is reasonable.   
11
underweighting of those funds with an equity income objective.      
4.0  Empirical Results
In order to determine the optimal lag structure for the general model specified in (6),
alternative lag structures were run for both the exogenous and endogenous variables using the
fixed coefficient model with and without time dummy variables to denote the quarter.  The
Schwarz Criteria  was used to determine the order of the ARMA process identified in equation
14
(6).  The criteria uses Bayesian arguments for choosing the most likely posterior model.  The
optimal lag structure is the one that minimizes the value of the criteria. The results shown in Table
2 suggest that for lagged exogenous variables (i.e., performance) in the range of 4-10 lags,  the
Schwarz Criteria reaches a minimum with three lagged endogenous variables (i.e., historic market
shares) and changes little thereafter.  Over all lagged exogenous variables, given three lagged
endogenous variables, moreover, the Schwarz Criteria reaches a minimum with 8 lags with little
change thereafter.  Hence, we chose to work with a specification of 8 lagged exogenous and 3
lagged endogenous variables.  
Since the focus of this paper is on the effect of past performance on managerial
compensation, we examined the future effect of a one-time-only increase in performance on the  There is no test for unit root in panel data.  However, is we use the test statistics provided by Fuller
15
(1976) treating our data as if they came from a single time series sample, the unit root hypothesis is rejected at the
1%  level.
12
change in market share for 1-3 lagged endogenous variables given 4 and 8 lags in the exogenous
variables.  Figure 1 presents the graphs based upon 4 lagged exogenous variables while Figure 2 is
based upon 8 lagged exogenous variables.  Each graph shows that the change in future market
shares is quite similar for the one time increase in performance regardless of the assumed lag in
the endogenous variable.  With 4 lagged exogenous variables, market share increases at an
increasing rate each quarter for the first year and then increases but at a decreasing rate during the
ensuing periods.  For 8 exogenous variables, there is an additional spurt in market share in each
quarter of  the second year followed by increases at a decreasing rate thereafter.
The basic results of equation (6) are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.  By all the
usual criteria the results are highly significant and support the model. Past performance over the
preceding 8 quarters affects market shares in a consistent manner, with heavier weights accorded
the more recent year.  A very strong pattern of persistence is apparent, though the results are
clearly statistically different from unit root.    In terms of our expectations model, expectations of
15
future performance appear to be based upon past performance with increasing weights over the
last 8 quarters and decreasing thereafter.
The high degree of persistence suggests that expectations are revised very slowly.  This is
consistent with the fact that, due to a large degree of individual fund performance variance, the
information contained in any quarterly performance measure is very noisy and must be heavily
discounted, leading to expectations being revised gradually over time.  The existence of  Transactions costs which discourage switching funds involve front-end and back-end loads, as well as
16
the costs of continuously monitoring and evaluating one's investment portfolio.  These informational costs can be
very high for unsophisticated investors.
  As suggested before, the lack of a non-linear response to negative results may be due to survivorship
17
bias.  However, Chevalier & Ellison’s study also suffers from such bias.  It is possible that the differences are due
to Chevalier & Ellison’s use of annual data rather than quarterly data and their failure to account for risk in their
performance evaluation.  
13
transactions costs will tend to reinforce this effect.   As investors tend to hold funds for a
16
relatively long period, they use past performance information to forecast  long term  performance
of funds and hence discount short-term variations.
Columns 3-9 examine the non-linearity hypotheses specified in equation (7).  Column 3
shows the basic model appended by squared performance terms, separated for positive and
negative values of alpha.  The results showed consistent positive non-linear effects for the last 4
quarters for positive alphas, but no systematic pattern for the next 4 quarters of positive
performance, or for negative performance over all 8 quarters.   Hence, we present only the results
for the first 4 quarters.
It is clear that positive performance affects market share in a non-linear fashion.  These
results are consistent with those of Chevalier & Ellison (1995).  However, in contrast to Chevalier
& Ellison, we fail to find a non-linear effect of negative performance.   The significance of the
17
non-linear effect associated with positive performance supports the hypothesis that heavy
advertizing associated with positive performance increases investors’ responses to these very
positive performance levels. At the same time, the absence of a non-linear effect for the poor
performers supports the hypothesis that funds tend to not advertize their failures.  
These non-linearities also lead to incentives for excessive fund-specific risk taking on the    Other fund attributes (e.g., tenure of manager as of December 1993, management company and
18
objective of the fund) were also examined with none of these variables exhibiting significant additional explanatory
power.  We also examined the effect of excluding funds with minimum initial investments of at least $25,000 and
funds less than two years of age as did Chevalier & Ellison (1995), but unlike these authors, we found our results
robust to the inclusion of these funds. 
  We tested different cutoff levels for fund size as well as a linear effect.  The effects were generally
19
present for various specifications, but were best for the division reported.  
14
part of risk neutral (or only slightly risk averse) managers.  Note, however, that such incentives
are related to the alphas and therefore apply only to risks which are uncorrelated with the market.  
The basic model does not allow for differences among funds, except for those affecting the
constant terms which are absorbed by the fixed effects.  However, there are reasons to believe
that the effects of past performance on market share may differ across funds in a systematic way. 
Columns 4-6 in Table 4 show the effects of two fund attributes (load and size) which had a
significant effect on the performance coefficients within the linear specification while columns 7-9
present the results for the non-linear specification.     Focussing on the non-linear models because
18
of their greater level of explanation, the results suggest that fund size tends to increase the
sensitivity of market share to past performance in a non-linear way.  The market share of large
funds with assets in excess of $1.5 billion at the end of 1993 was significantly more responsive to
past performance than was smaller funds.   We believe that this is due to the fact that large funds
19
are more widely known by investors and their performance is much more extensively publicized,
whether by the financial press or due to their own advertizing.
We also find a significant difference in investor responses to the past performance of load
and no-load funds.  Load funds are significantly less sensitive to past performance.  This is
probably because investors in load funds are more likely to rely on the advice of financial planners
and brokers, who tend to benefit from directing investors to load funds.  Such investors are likely  See further discussion of this issue in the next section.
20
  There is an argument that financial advisers may cause excessive movement between funds in order to
21
benefit from new sales commissions.  However, the existence of trailer fees and long-term client relationships
reduce this incentive.  Our evidence clearly does not support this argument.
  Fama (1972) has suggested a finer breakdown of overall performance into the return for selectivity  and
22
the return for undertaking risk.   Moses, Cheney and Veit (1987), moreover, have also developed a portfolio
measure that differentiates between selection, diversification and timing ability.  Reilly (1989) shows that the rank
correlation coefficients among alternative measures are all above 0.900. 
15
to be less informed and possibly more risk averse than better informed investors.  As a
20
consequence, they are less responsive to past performance in their fund choice.
21
An alternative argument suggests that loads are likely to increase investor inertia, i.e.
investors in load funds invest for a longer time horizon than those investing in no-load funds.  To
examine this proposition we tested for differences between the persistence coefficients for load
and no-load funds.  While the results are consistent with this hypothesis, they are largely
insignificant. There is no significant differences in persistence between the two types of
investments.  All investor types appear to invest for the long haul.
The issue of the "correct" measure of performance bedevils much of the theoretical and
empirical literature.  The problem involves first, the nature of the valuation and the relevant
components of risk which are appropriate for discounting  raw returns and second, the
relationship between ex ante evaluation of risk and ex post measures.  In the choice of measures,
we have concentrated on relatively simple measures based upon information which is generally
available to investors.  In particular we compare the following measures and their components:
raw returns, the Jensen measure (alpha), the Treynor measure and the Sharpe measure.   
22
In contrast to most empirical studies which evaluate  ex post performance using a measure
of variance or beta calculated over the entire  ex post period, we focus on the ex ante evaluation  The use of time varying betas also significantly reduces the multicollinearity among the alternative
23
performance measures.  Refer to Table 3 which shows the correlation between the Jensen and Sharpe measures to
range from .38 to .61 depending upon the fund's objective.
  Due to the existence of time dummies we cannot distinguish between the raw returns and the excess
24
returns above the market and the excess returns above the risk free rate.  
16
of risk based upon the information available at the time.  Thus, we use a time varying measure of
beta (or variance)  for each fund estimated over the prior 36 month period.  As can be seen from
Figure 3, these estimates of beta vary considerably over the period, from an average high of 1.14
in 92:4 to a low of .95 in 89:1, with many individual fund betas exhibiting considerable variation
as shown in Figure 4.   These estimates of beta enable us to distinguish among some of the
different measures of performance and to evaluate risk measures even in the presence of time
dummy variables required for our model.   Table 5 compares the four performance measures
23
using the basic model.  It is clear that the Jensen measure is superior to the raw returns and to
24
the Sharpe and Treynor measures. 
To further investigate the nature of risk discounting, we disaggregated the Jensen measure
into its return and risk components.  The results, presented in Table 6, suggest that market risk is
more heavily discounted by investors than would be indicated by alpha.   The additional risk
measures in column 2 are all highly significant and their sum is about equal, in absolute value, to
the sum to the sum of the coefficients on alpha.  Thus, the effect of an increase in market risk on
investor allocations appears to be twice as large as the effect of the same increase in unadjusted
returns.
It is difficult to evaluate whether this greater weight  attached to the estimated market risk
is due to a higher degree of risk aversion  than allowed for in the Jensen measure, or because of  a17
greater confidence in the evaluation of risk.  As the variance in the alphas of each fund is far
greater than that of the betas, investors should discount the information contained in limited
period alphas more heavily than the information contained in the betas, leading to the observed
results.  We can not, however, distinguish between this forecasting error effect and the level of
risk aversion.
Table 6 shows that these results are robust to the inclusion of variable effects and non-
linearities.  Similarly, the non-linearities are unaffected by the inclusion of separate risk variables
or fund characteristics.  However, the risk effects do vary by size and load characteristics. 
Investors in large funds appear to be more responsive to recent returns  and to risk.  This supports
the hypothesis that investors are more likely to have information about these funds.
In contrast, investors in load funds are less sensitive to returns  and risk.  While the first
part of this statement is straightforward, the second part, suggesting that load funds are also less
sensitive to risk requires some explanation.  Since the coefficient of XLBIRT-LOAD is negative,
as is the sum of the LBIRT coefficients, the product of these terms has a  positive effect upon the
original negative influence of the systematic risk component.  Therefore, investors in load funds
are less sensitive to risk than are investors in no-load funds.   This supports our previous
argument that investors in load funds are likely to be less informed rather than more risk averse.
  Advisory services frequently rate funds on the basis of  their performance in up and down
phases of the market cycle.  In order to test whether investors respond differently to past
performance under different market conditions, we identified a market trough as a period in which
there was a net outflow of capital from mutual funds to other investments.   We approximated the
net flow of capital into funds each quarter by calculating the percentage change in the sum of the18
net asset values for the funds existing each quarter in our sample less the return on the S&P 500
in that quarter.  For the 53 quarters between 1980:4 and 1993:4, we were able to identify 14
periods in which there was a net outflow.  Table 7 examines whether recent past performance
during bearish trough periods had a different effect upon future market shares relative to
performance in those boom periods in which there were a net inflows into funds.   The first model
focuses on the Jensen performance measure and suggests that performance during trough periods
has less effect upon future market shares than does performance during boom periods.  The
second model shows the Jensen measure and the systematic risk premium as separate explanators. 
The results show that past performance levels have less effect upon future market share during
trough periods than they do during boom periods.    These results suggest that investors discount
performance during trough periods and weigh more heavily available information during boom
periods in making their investment decisions.                 
5.0  Are Investors Acting Rationally?
The expectations upon which predicted market shares are based in equation (7) rest upon
investors choosing between funds on the basis of the relative historic performance of the funds in
their choice set.  The empirical evidence presented in this paper strongly suggests that investors 
use historic performance measures in making their investment decisions.  Because investors are
assumed to regularly adjust their portfolio holdings using available historic information, the
question that arises is, are they acting rationally over time? To examine this question, we
regressed the excess return in quarter t, as well as the two-quarter through six-quarter mean
excess return, against the past eight quarters of the excess return.  19
Table 8 shows the relationship between future performance and past fund performance. 
Although the historic performance measures are only weakly related to future quarterly excess
returns, the coefficients of the past performance variables increase in significance and are
consistently positive as the expected holding period increases beyond half a year.  The picture
which emerges from this table is consistent with the time pattern of weights assigned to past
performance in Table 4, where the implicit forecasts of future performance are more heavily
weighted by the last four quarters of past performance.  The fact that recent past performance is a
better predictor of performance over more than one quarter is also consistent with the high
persistence we found in the market share behavior of funds over time.  These results are
consistent with those of Gruber (1996) who also finds a significant relationship between past
alphas and future performance.
Because the sample used in the regression analysis consists of only those funds that 
survived to December 1993, a bias may be introduced into any conclusion regarding the
persistence of managers.   On the one hand, the funds that failed to survive have had a history of
poor performance.  Their historic returns, though negative, are positively correlated.  Excluding
these positively correlated poor performers reduces the positive correlation among the remaining
funds in the sample that survived.  Hence, the bias caused by excluding the funds that failed to
survive is against the finding of positive correlation over time.   On the other hand, common
factors in stock returns and persistent differences in expenses and transactions costs have been
shown by Carhart (1997) to possibly induce positive serial correlation in risk-adjusted returns
which might otherwise be interpreted as reflecting superior  ability of fund managers.  At the same
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in the absence of expenses and transactions costs. Therefore, although our results are consistent
with investors acting rationally, there may very well be factors other than the stock picking ability
of managers that explain the observed positive serial correlation in risk adjusted returns.
               
 6.0  Incentive Properties of Asset-Based Fees
The incentive properties of asset-based fees are closely linked to the market's response to
past fund performance.  All other things equal, a one-time increase in fund return produces a
corresponding permanent increase in cash flows to the manager.  Hence, there is a strong
incentive with the asset-based fee structure for managers to improve their performance.  To see
this we assume for simplicity a single lag structure for the endogenous component of our model. 
We can then examine the predictions with respect to the incentive effects.
To begin, we define the asset-based fee per dollar of net asset value as f and let A  be the t
net asset value of the fund in period t.  It follows that the product of these two variables, fA  , t
represents the compensation to the manager,  .  Starting from a steady state in which market t
shares in each period are equal, i.e. M = M  = ...= M , we have t t-1 0
where g is the growth rate of total industry assets so that  A = e A  ;   is the period-to-period t 0
gt
persistence in market share; and a is the growth rate of the fund which is unrelated to the fund's
performance.  By assumption, moreover, x = 0 for all t. t
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  Note that this expression for b holds for periods greater than 2 years and is reduced for shorter
25
horizons. 
 Average fund growth was approximated by calculating the average growth in fund assets over the
26
period less the average growth in the number of funds over the same period.
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              (10)         
(11)
where  .  Since Ln M = a/(1- ) in the steady state, it then follows that the
25
0 
change in the present value of the net compensation benefits (  ) relative to the initial net asset 
value, A  , is: 0
where r is the quarterly discount rate and T is the expected tenure of the manager.  For T  and 
r+(1- ) > g,
We can now look at the empirical estimates of our model in order to understand the
incentive implications for the manager.  Suppose we assume a 1 percent increase in the annual
performance, or .25% in a single quarter.  From Table 4 (Column 1), b 1.86 and (1- ) .026.
Average fund growth over the 82:4 to 93:4 period (g) was approximately .0292 per quarter
26
which we use to approximate the steady-state rate of growth.  The condition for r+(1-)>g is22
satisfied for r>.003.   As a benchmark, assume that managers fully diversify their individual wealth
and use the risk-free quarterly discount rate which is approximately .0162.  It  follows that the
change in lifetime compensation for a one-time increase in performance of .25% is 35% of the
performance increase.  It is clear that the incentives are very sensitive to the manager's discount
rate.  If the degree of diversification is less than perfect, a higher discount rate will be used.  For
example, a discount rate of .0429 which is the average quarterly return on the S&P 500 over the
period would reduce the effect of lifetime earnings to 12% of the change in performance. 
7.0  Summary and Conclusions
This paper examined the mutual fund market over the 1976-1993 period.  From among the
performance measures which investors have the required information to calculate, it was found
that the Jensen measure best explained the change in market shares over time. An interesting
result of the empirical analysis was that investors appear to actually weigh the systematic
component of risk more than suggested by the use of the Jensen measure.  Investors, moreover, 
value recent past performance differently for funds with different attributes (e.g., size and load). 
An important result of the paper is that investors use historic performance measures in making
their investment decisions. The effect of this result is that there are strong incentives for managers
to increase their performance and by doing so, their compensation under a fixed-fee remuneration
mechanism.  The paper also finds evidence that is consistent  with investors acting rationally over
time.   While they rely upon past performance to make their investment decisions, the past
performance of funds is positively related to the future performance.  Investors appear, moreover, 
to use historic performance  measures over a long time horizon when they have long expectedholding periods.  Hence, the fixed-fee compensation mechanism adopted by most funds not only 
provides strong incentives, but there is evidence that these incentives may be based upon rational




Size ($MM) Morningstar % Sub-Sample %
5000+ 15 1.2 10 1.1
1000-4999 93 8.0 74 8.6
500-999 91 7.9 81 9.4
100-499 346 29.6 257 29.9
50-99 200 17.1 150 17.4
10-49 273 23.4 192 22.3
10- 150 12.8 96 11.2
Objective
Aggressive Growth 70 6.0 64 7.4
Growth 542 46.2 440 51.2
Growth & Income 297 25.3 208 24.2
Small Company 186 15.8 144 16.7
Equity Income 79 6.7 4 .5
Load
Front-end 444 37.8 343 39.9
Deferred 138 11.8 102 11.9
No-Load 592 50.4 415 48.3
Fund Manager Tenure (Years)*
20+ 26 2.3 20 2.4
10-19 89 7.9 76 9.1
5-9 274 24.2 219 26.3
1-4 693 61.3 497 59.8
0 48 4.2 19 2.3
Age of Fund (Years)
50+ 40 3.4 35 4.1
30-49 78 6.6 60 7.0
10-29 251 21.4 219 25.5
5-9 292 24.9 216 25.13-4 193 16.4 137 16.0
2 203 17.3 135 15.7
1 117 10.0 58 6.7
* Subsample sum does not add up to 860 due to non-reporting of tenure by 29 firms.
Table 2
LAG STRUCTURE
Dependent variable: Ln(M) t
Lagged Lagged      No Time Dummies Schwarz    Time Dummies Schwarz
Exog. Endog. Var. of Res. No. of Obs. Criteria Var. of Res. No. of Obs. Criteria
4 1 0.0118 12212 -4.4392 0.0114 12212 -4.4701
4 2 0.0116 12203 -4.4488 0.0114 12203 -4.4769
4 3 0.0108 12194 -4.5241 0.0105 12194 -4.5507
4 4 0.0107 12185 -4.5297 0.0105 12185 -4.5549
4 5 0.0107 12174 -4.5304 0.0105 12174 -4.5556
5 1 0.0118 11769 -4.4399 0.0114 11769 -4.4723
5 2 0.0106 11760 -4.5439 0.0103 11760 -4.5738
5 3 0.0108 11751 -4.5252 0.0105 11751 -4.5536
5 4 0.0107 11742 -4.5295 0.0105 11742 -4.5564
5 5 0.0107 11733 -4.5326 0.0104 11733 -4.5593
6 1 0.0117 11346 -4.4469 0.0113 11346 -4.4812
6 2 0.0106 11337 -4.5478 0.0102 11337 -4.5794
6 3 0.0107 11328 -4.5333 0.0104 11328 -4.5641
6 4 0.0107 11319 -4.5373 0.0104 11319 -4.5665
6 5 0.0106 11310 -4.5405 0.0103 11310 -4.5694
7 1 0.0114 10934 -4.4715 0.0110 10934 -4.5103
7 2 0.0104 10925 -4.5632 0.0101 10925 -4.5980
7 3 0.0104 10916 -4.5614 0.0100 10916 -4.5972
7 4 0.0103 10907 -4.5643 0.0100 10907 -4.5983
7 5 0.0103 10898 -4.5667 0.0100 10898 -4.6001
8 1 0.0103 10534 -4.5698 0.0099 10534 -4.6124
8 2 0.0098 10525 -4.6231 0.0095 10525 -4.6583
8 3 0.0092 10516 -4.6874 0.0089 10516 -4.7218
8 4 0.0091 10507 -4.6915 0.0089 10507 -4.7234
8 5 0.0091 10498 -4.6933 0.0088 10498 -4.7242
9 1 0.0101 10149 -4.5920 0.0098 10149 -4.6341
9 2 0.0095 10140 -4.6459 0.0092 10140 -4.6820
9 3 0.0089 10131 -4.7155 0.0086 10131 -4.7499
9 4 0.0089 10122 -4.7203 0.0086 10122 -4.75229 5 0.0089 10113 -4.7216 0.0086 10113 -4.7528
10 1 0.0101 9781 -4.5945 0.0097 9781 -4.6376
10 2 0.0096 9772 -4.6446 0.0092 9772 -4.6823
10 3 0.0089 9763 -4.7150 0.0086 9763 -4.7560
10 4 0.0088 9754 -4.7240 0.0086 9754 -4.7579
10 5 0.0088 9745 -4.7249 0.0085 9745 -4.7580Table 3 
CORRELATION OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES BY OBJECTIVE
Sharpe Treynor
Jensen
   All Funds .4573 .4483
   Aggressive Growth .5396 .5251
   Growth .4474 .4374
   Growth & Income .3828 .3800
   Small Company .6053 .5805
Sharpe
   All Funds - .9916
   Aggressive Growth - .9917
   Growth - .9908
   Growth & Income - .9927
   Small Company - .9919Table 4
FIXED EFFECTS OLSQ MODEL
(TIME DUMMIES INCLUDED/EXPLANATORS CROSSED WITH LAGGED EXOG.) 
  Dependent variable:  Ln(M) t
MODEL 1 2 3 4  5  6 7 8 9
Ln(M ) t-1 -0.0255 0.0341 0.0268 0.0263 0.0303   0.0234 0.0150 0.0203 0.0126
c b b b b a c c c
Ln(M ) t-1 0.008 0.0161 0.0081 0.01020 0.0101 0.0107 0.0135 0.0126
Ln(M ) t-3 -0.0713 -0.0733 -0.0642 -0.0707 -0.0639 -0.0577 -0.0664 -0.0578
c c c c c c c
ALPHAt-1 0.321 0.255 0.204 0.236 0.324 0.296 0.151 0.244 0.208
c c c c c c c c c
ALPHAt-2 0.223 0.119 0.122 0.119 0.151 0.147 0.057 0.050 0.074
c c c c c c b b
ALPHAt-3 0.366 0.323 0.294 0.297 0.392 0.360 0.215 0.341 0.279
c c c c c c c c c
ALPHAt-4 0.374 0.338 0.305 0.287 0.396 0.339 0.079 0.135 0.101
c c c c c c c c c
ALPHAt-5 0.105 0.066 0.069 0.074 0.067 0.079 0.077 0.078 0.088
c a a b a b c b c
ALPHAt-6 0.164 0.132 0.118 0.130 0.135 0.139 0.126 0.153 0.141
c s c c c c c c c
ALPHAt-7 0.214 0.189 0.170 0.180 0.224 0.214 0.152 0.217 0.190
c s c c c c c c c
ALPHAt-8 0.229 0.209 0.197 0.181 0.250 0.217 0.147 0.243 0.185
c s c c c c c c c
DSALPHA 0.071 t-1
c 0.020 0.019 0.019
c c c
DSALPHA 0.048 t-2
c 0.015 0.018 0.015
c c c
DSALPHA 0.011 t-3
a 0.020 0.017 0.019
c c c
DSALPHA 0.006 t-4 0.051 0.049 0.051
c c c
X-SIZE 0.880 0.697 1.501 1.138
c c c c
X-LOAD -0.321 -0.312 -0.377 -0.378
c c c c
Adj R 0.1877 0.1948 0.2197 0.2289 0.2270 0.2307 0.2442 0.2403 0.2452
2
Var of Res. 0.00895 0.009 0.00860 0.00850 0.0085 0.00848 0.00833 0.00837 0.00832
  Significant at 5%.
a
 Significant at 1%.
b  
 Significant at .1%.
c   
Note: Ln(M) is the logarithm of market share at end of  t; t
ALPHA  = R   -   (R - R ) - R ; t-1 it-1 it-1 Mt-1 ft-1 ft-1
SIZE refers to dummy variable for those funds exceeding $1.5 billion in NAV during the last quarter of     
   1993;
LOAD is the dummy variable for those funds which charge either front-end or rear-end load fees; and
DSALPHA is the square of the excess return in t-1for those funds with non-negative values of ALPHA t-1   t-1Table 5
FIXED EFFECTS OLSQ MODEL
ALTERNATIVE PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
  Dependent variable:  Ln(M) t
MODEL 1  MODEL 2     MODEL 3   MODEL 4  
   Jensen Returns      Sharpe   Treynor
Ln(M ) 0.0341 0.0536 0.0472 0.0452 t-1
b c c c
Ln(M ) 0.0078 0.0147 0.0011 0.0029 t-2
Ln(M ) -0.0713 -0.0991 -0.0766 -0.0775 t-3
c c c c
X 0.255 0.177 1.91 0.220 t-1
c c c c
X 0.119 0.013 0.916 0.103 t-2
c b b
X 0.323 0.228 2.81 0.292 t-3
c c c c
X 0.338 0.262 3.12 0.324 t-4
c c c c
X 0.066 0.034 0.750 0.748 t-5
a b b
X 0.132 0.044 1.22 0.119 t-6
c c c
X 0.189 0.141 1.30 0.155 t-7
c c c c
X 0.209 0.200 2.01 0.227 t-8
c c c c
Adj R 0.1948 0.1833 0.1878 0.1885
2
Var of Res. 0.00888 0.00900 0.00895 0.00894
  Significant at 5%.
a
 Significant at 1%.
b  
 Significant at .1%.
c   
Note: Ln(M) is the logarithm of market share at end of  t; t
X  =Performance measure in t-1. t-1Table 6
FIXED EFFECTS OLSQ MODEL
(TIME DUMMIES INCLUDED/EXPLANATORS CROSSED WITH LAGGED EXOG.) 
  Dependent variable:  Ln(M) t
MODEL   1  2  3 4  5  6 7 8
Ln(M ) -0.0247 0.0388 0.0309   0.0344 0.0275 0.0192 0.0243 0.0163 t-1
c c b b b a a
Ln(M ) 0.0179 0.0188 0.0203 0.0209 0.0213 0.0241 0.0234 t-2
Ln(M ) -0.0856 -0.0789 -0.0845 -0.0784 -0.0722 -0.0804 -0.0719 t-3
c c c c c c c
ALPHA 0.301 0.229 0.212 0.299 0.273 0.121 0.207 0.177 t-1
c c c c c c c c
ALPHA 0.221 0.099 0.101 0.132 0.130 0.035 0.016 0.051 t-2
c b c c c
ALPHA 0.362 0.311 0.290 0.383 0.357 0.199 0.327 0.270 t-3
c c c c c c c c
ALPHA 0.366 0.322 0.275 0.381 0.329 0.063 0.113 0.086 t-4
c c c c c a a a
ALPHA 0.096 0.053 0.062 0.051 0.065 0.066 0.061 0.076 t-5
b a a b
ALPHA 0.144 0.105 0.105 0.102 0.108 0.101 0.114 0.110 t-6
c c c b c c c c
ALPHA 0.200 0.172 0.164 0.207 0.198 0.135 0.201 0.175 t-7
c c c c c c c c
ALPHA 0.215 0.193 0.168 0.236 0.207 0.131 0.229 0.173 t-8
c c c c c c c c
LBIRT -0.135 -0.221 -0.192 -0.251 -0.221 -0.224 -0.286 -0.253 t-1
a c b c c c c c
LBIRT -0.318 -0.418 -0.400 -0.459 -0.440 -0.431 -0.493 -0.471 t-2
c c c c c c c c
LBIRT -0.268 -0.257 -0.246 -0.285 -0.272 -0.269 -0.308 -0.293 t-3
c c c c c c c c
LBIRT -0.150 -0.138 -0.144 -0.170 -0.174 -0.196 -0.223 -0.227 t-4
a a a b b c c c
LBIRT -0.236 -0.231 -0.205 -0.258 -0.232 -0.214 -0.266 -0.239 t-5
c c c c c c c c
LBIRT -0.344 -0.347 -0.346 -0.375 -0.372 -0.369 -0.396 -0.396 t-6
c c c c c c c c
LBIRT -0.107 -0.109 -0.107 -0.114 -0.112 -0.114 -0.132 -0.121 t-7
a a a a a a a a
LBIRT -0.002 0.000 0.011 -0.018 -0.006 -0.016 -0.045 -0.032 t-8
DSALPHA 0.022 0.022 0.021 t-1
c c c
DSALPHA 0.017 0.019 0.017 t-2
c c c
DSALPHA 0.021 0.019 0.020 t-3
c c c
DSALPHA 0.052 0.050 0.052 t-4
c c c
XALPHA-SIZE 0.873 0.668 1.614 01.159
c c c c
XLBIRT-SIZE 0.133 0.121 0.114 0.103
c a a a
XALPHA-LOAD -0.374 -0.339 -0.430 -0.438
c c c b
XLBIRT-LOAD -0.108 -0.106 -0.106 -0.104
a a a a
Adj R 0.1957 0.2044 0.2386 0.2370 0.3406 0.2546 0.2517 0.2564
2
Var of Res. 0.00887 0.00877 0.00839 0.00841 0.00837 0.00822 0.00825 0.00820
  Significant at 5%.
a
 Significant at 1%.
b  
 Significant at .1%.
c   
Note: Ln(M) is the logarithm of market share at end of  t; t
ALPHA  = R   -   (R - R ) - R ; t-1 it-1 it-1 Mt-1 ft-1 ft-1
LBIRT  =  (R - R ); t-1 it-1 Mt-1 ft-1
SIZE refers to dummy variable for those funds exceeding $1.5 billion in NAV during the last quarter of     
    1993;
LOAD is the dummy variable for those funds which charge either front-end or rear-end  load fees; and
DSALPHA is the square of the excess return in t-1for those funds with non-negative values of ALPHA t-1   t-1Table 7
THE EFFECT OF MARKET CYCLE CHANGES  
              Dependent variable:  Ln(M) t
Jensen Jensen-Split
Ln(M ) 0.0331 0.0380 t-1
b c
Ln(M ) 0.0085 0.0189 t-2
Ln(M ) -0.0712 -0.0859 t-3
c c
ALPHA 0.285 0.250 t-1
c c
ALPHA 0.141 0.108 t-2
c b
ALPHA 0.339 0.314 t-3
c c
ALPHA 0.383 0.363 t-4
c c
ALPHA 0.090 0.077 t-5
a a
ALPHA 0.174 0.149 t-6
c c
ALPHA 0.143 0.127 t-7
c c
















CALPHA -0.133 -0.088 t-1
a
CALPHA -0.098 -0.037 t-2
CALPHA -0.061 0.005 t-3
CALPHA -0.224 -0.209 t-4
b b
CALPHA -0.097 -0.093 t-5
CALPHA -0.162 -0.163 t-6
a b
CALPHA 0.151 0.147 t-7
a b
CALPHA -0.034 -0.045 t-8
Adj R 0.1969 0.2060
2
Var of Residuals 0.00885 0.00875
  Significant at 5%.
a
 Significant at 1%.
b  
 Significant at .1%.
c   
Note: Ln(M) is the logarithm of market share at end of  t; t
ALPHA  = R   -   (R - R ) - R ; t-1 it-1 it-1 Mt-1 ft-1 ft-1
LBIRT  =  (R - R ); and t-1 t-1  Mt-1  ft-1 






FUTURE PERFORMANCE VS. PAST PERFORMANCE
(Without Lagged Market Share Variable)
Dependent Variable
ALPHA M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 t
C -.261 -.281 -.335 -.390 -.422 -.457
b b b b b b
ALPHA .0005 .021 .036 .059 .022 .026 t-1
a b b b b
ALPHA .011 .064 .082 .023 .026 .061 t-2
b b b b b
ALPHA .126 .119 .040 .042 .063 .043 t-3
b b b b b b
ALPHA .108 .015 .027 .065 .048 .028 t-4
b a b b b b
ALPHA -.080 -.019 .026 .011 .0008 .004 t-5
b a b
ALPHA .036 .060 .032 .012 .024 .012 t-6
b b b a b a
ALPHA .096 .056 .019 .026 .011 -.005 t-7
b b a b a
ALPHA .018 -.020 .011 -.008 -.009 .003 t-8
a
Adj R .051 .056 .043 .045 .038 .041
2
Var of Res. 14.209 7.224 4.982 3.960 3.453 2.895
Note: ALPHA = R   -   (R - R ) - R where ALPHA is expressed in percentage terms t it it Mt ft ft  
   Significant at 5%
a
 Significant at 1%
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VARIANCE OF BETAS ACROSS FUNDS
Figure 3
Figure 4